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ABSTRACT Although interim regimes in former autocracies are generally tasked with initiating 
a democratic ‘new normal’, they may privately intend to become their country’s new autocratic 
rulers. We argue that, to cope with the uncertainty stemming from this possibility, investors infer 
an interim regime’s intentions from the dominance displayed by the regime during government-
related violence, as reflected in the share of  civilian fatalities. Specifically, we propose that inves-
tors interpret higher interim-regime dominance as a signal of  weaker democratic intentions and 
associate such weaker intentions with a gloomier political outlook for local firms. We therefore 
hypothesize that investors react more negatively to violent events characterized by higher 
interim-regime dominance. We also hypothesize a less negative effect of  such dominance for 
firms with larger foreign footprints, lower indebtedness, or more concentrated ownership, since 
investors will likely consider such firms more resilient to political deterioration. Applying event 
study methodology to 94 spells of  violence in Egypt during the Arab Spring, we find substantial 
support for our hypotheses, thus contributing to management research on investor decision-
making, violence, and political uncertainty.
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The fall of  long-standing despots (…) is a necessary part of  any transition to democracy. But it can 
also start a civil war, or lead to a new dictatorship as the next strongman builds his own networks of  
power
The Economist (2019, p. 54) in response to the fall of  Sudan’s autocratic leader Omar 
al-Bashir on 11 April.
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INTRODUCTION
Many management studies have explored how firms are affected by the actions and poli-
cies of  national governments (e.g., Malik and Kotabe, 2009; Sun et al., 2015). In general, 
these studies focused either implicitly or explicitly on conventional types of  governments 
in the form of  democracies and autocracies (Alvarez et al., 1996). However, over the past 
70 years more than 40 countries have at some point had a different type of  regime – 
namely, an ‘interim’ one (Geddes et al., 2014; Guttieri and Piombo, 2007).
Interim regimes are especially common in countries that have just experienced a col-
lapse of  autocratic rule. In such countries, interim regimes are generally tasked with 
initiating a transition to a so-called ‘new normal’, broadly defined as economic, political, 
or social conditions that are fundamentally different from the traditional state of  the 
environment (Ahlstrom et al., 2017; Hitt et al., 2016). More specifically, interim regimes 
in former autocracies are typically tasked with initiating a new normal of  democratic 
governance by organizing free and fair elections and handing over power to the elected 
officials shortly afterwards (Geddes et al., 2014; Seely, 2009).
Although interim regimes in former autocracies often claim to be committed to their 
task of  initiating a democratic new normal, they may privately intend to become their 
country’s new autocratic rulers (Pevehouse, 2005). Examples of  countries that have 
had such untrustworthy interim regimes include Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Yemen. The interim regimes of  these and other countries at 
some point during their tenure announced that they had decided to prolong their rule, 
often under the pretence of  ‘national interest’ (Shain and Linz, 1995). Since interim re-
gimes may develop the private intention to become autocratic rulers at any point during 
their tenure, potential and actual investors in local firms face substantial political uncer-
tainty during interim periods. To cope with this uncertainty, investors will likely attempt 
to obtain information on an interim regime’s political intentions throughout its tenure, 
but how exactly they do so has remained unclear.
In this study, we combine insights from the behavioural perspective on investor deci-
sion-making (e.g., Schijven and Hitt, 2012) with political science research on regimes’ 
use of  violence (e.g., Davenport, 1999, 2007) to propose that investors infer an interim 
regime’s political intentions during its tenure from crude pieces of  public information, or 
‘signals’. Specifically, we argue that investors infer these intentions from the share of  civil-
ian fatalities in the total death toll resulting from events of  government-related violence 
in the country, a share that we refer to as the ‘dominance’ shown by the interim regime. 
We argue that investors interpret higher interim-regime dominance during a given vio-
lent event as a signal that the regime has weaker democratic intentions at that time, and 
that investors associate such weaker intentions with a more adverse political outlook for 
local firms. We therefore hypothesize that violent events characterized by higher inter-
im-regime dominance are received more negatively by the local stock market.
Furthermore, we argue that investors use pieces of  information on individual firms as 
signals of  a firm’s resilience to the adverse political developments that may result from 
high interim-regime dominance. Specifically, we contend that investors consider this re-
silience to be higher among firms with larger foreign footprints, lower indebtedness, or 
more concentrated ownership structures. For such firms we therefore hypothesize the 
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negative relationship between an interim regime’s dominance during a violent event and 
the stock market’s reaction to that event to be weaker.
We find support for most of  our hypotheses in an event study of  94 spells of  deadly 
violence that occurred under the two interim regimes that ruled Egypt during the Arab 
Spring. Our study thereby contributes to three streams of  management research. First, 
it contributes to the behavioural perspective of  investor decision-making, which has pro-
posed that investors tend to infer the intentions of  managers from signals (Connelly et al., 
2011), given that these intentions may be self-serving and are unlikely to be made public 
(Schijven and Hitt, 2012). Our findings enrich this perspective by showing that investors 
also use signals to develop insight into the private intentions of  external actors, in our 
case the political intentions of  interim governments in former autocracies. In addition, 
our findings suggest that investors use firm-specific characteristics in the form of  a firm’s 
foreign footprint and ownership structure as signals of  its resilience to adverse politi-
cal developments, given that this resilience is generally also hard to ascertain otherwise 
(DesJardine et al., 2019).
Second, our study contributes to research on how firms are affected by violence. 
Specifically, whereas prior studies explored how firms are affected by the severity and 
spatial attributes of  violence (Dai et al., 2013, 2017; Witte et al., 2017), our study focuses 
attention on the distribution of  the fatalities across the parties involved and shows the 
relevance of  this distribution for firms’ market value.
Finally, our study contributes to management research on political uncertainty by fo-
cusing on a hitherto unexplored source of  such uncertainty, namely the private nature 
of  a regime’s political intentions. Most prior management studies of  political uncertainty 
conceptualized such uncertainty as originating from a lack of  checks and balances in a 
country’s political system (e.g., Hendriks et al., 2018; Henisz, 2000).
BACKGROUND: INTERIM REGIMES AND THEIR INTENTIONS
When an autocratic country experiences a coup, revolution, or foreign invasion that 
causes its regime to collapse, an interim government is typically installed to initiate a 
transition to a democratic new normal (Guttieri and Piombo, 2007). Such a government 
differs from a conventional government in at least two important ways. First, whereas a 
conventional government tends to develop and implement a wide variety of  policies, an 
interim government usually has a very narrow mandate. In a former autocracy, an in-
terim government’s primary policy task is usually to organize free and fair elections that 
are meant to mark the beginning of  a democratic new normal for the country and its 
populace (Seely, 2009). Second, interim governments are supposed to rule for a shorter 
period than their conventional counterparts. Specifically, they are expected to hand over 
power to a group of  elected representatives within a reasonable timeframe, typically re-
garded to be two years (Shain and Linz, 1995).
Although interim regimes in former autocracies are supposed to organize democratic 
elections and hand over power to elected representatives soon afterwards, they may not 
necessarily intend to do so (Derpanopoulos et al., 2016; Pevehouse, 2005). At any time 
during their tenure, such regimes may privately intend to become their country’s new 
autocratic rulers, as they may develop an obsession for political power and a taste for 
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the psychological and monetary benefits it entails, including social status and personal 
wealth (Lewis, 1994; McGuire, 1995). Conversely, interim regimes may initially intend to 
become autocratic rulers but later start to become more committed to democratization 
under pressure of  powerful foreign nations that may threaten to intervene in the country 
(BBC, 2005; Seely, 2009). Although such shifts in an interim regime’s political intentions 
will ultimately materialize in the cancellation or the holding of  national elections, these 
shifts are usually not observable to regime outsiders until then.
Because interim regimes’ political intentions may experience shifts that are not di-
rectly observable, potential and actual investors in local firms face substantial uncertainty 
during interim periods about a country’s political outlook. Consequently, they will find it 
challenging to determine whether to buy, hold, or sell equity stakes in these firms during 
such periods. To be able to make informed investment decisions in the presence of  the 
political uncertainty they face, investors will likely want to have insight into an interim 
regime’s political intentions over the course of  its tenure. Below, we advance a frame-
work explaining how they develop that insight. This framework combines a behavioural 
perspective on investor decision-making with insights from political science research on 
regimes’ use of  violence.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Information Asymmetries and Signals
Information asymmetries, defined as situations wherein a party lacks information on 
another party’s traits or intentions, constitute a cornerstone of  management research 
on decision-making (Bergh et al., 2014). Such asymmetries may exist between various 
actors, of  which those between investors and managers have received most research at-
tention (Bergh et al., 2019). By virtue of  their insider status and active engagement in 
corporate decision-making, managers generally possess superior information on their 
firms’ traits and capabilities, and are thus entrusted by shareholders to take decisions 
that maximize the latter’s wealth. Yet, the interests of  managers and shareholders are not 
always aligned (Eisenhardt, 1989), meaning that managers may engage in behaviour that 
serves to attain their own objectives (Berle and Means, 1932). Because these objectives 
may be at odds with shareholder value creation, for example because they concern em-
pire-building or personal pay maximization (Haleblian et al., 2009), investors are usually 
keen on discerning the true intentions of  the top management of  the firms they have 
invested or consider investing in (Schijven and Hitt, 2012).
Discerning these intentions is typically challenging for investors, however. Even though 
managers may make public statements that supposedly reflect their intentions, such state-
ments cannot be taken at face value because they may be nothing more than ‘cheap talk’ 
meant to appease investors (Almazan et al., 2008) or distract attention from actual prac-
tice (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). Managers seeking to protect their position are prone to 
keep any opportunistic intentions they may have to themselves, meaning that corporate 
insiders such as directors and external experts such as financial analysts are also unlikely 
to be useful sources of  information on managers’ intentions (Bergh et al., 2019).
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Investors seeking to develop valuable insights into managers’ intentions are thus typi-
cally left with little choice but to resort to signals, defined as ‘crude but readily available 
pieces of  public information that reflect an underlying, hard-to-verify reality’ (Campbell 
et al., 2016, p. 166). The information to which a signal pertains is crude in two ways. 
First, the information is not necessarily completely accurate (Epstein and Schneider, 
2008; Park and Patel, 2015), for example because it concerns an estimate or is based on 
hearsay. Second, even if  the information is accurate, it is not always perfectly correlated 
with the unobserved construct it is supposed to capture (Busenitz et al., 2005; Connelly 
et al., 2011). Nonetheless, in the absence of  more reliable insights, signals are useful 
cues that shed at least some light on matters that investors find hard to gauge otherwise 
(Caner et al., 2018; Schepker et al., 2018). Investors have for instance been shown to use 
managers’ compensation structures, acquisition experience, and cultural backgrounds 
as signals of  managers’ motives for making acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2009; Schijven 
and Hitt, 2012).
Besides relying on signals to develop insight into the intentions of  managers, investors 
will likely also rely on signals to develop insight into the political intentions of  interim 
regimes in former autocracies. The reason is that, like the intentions of  managers, the 
political intentions of  interim regimes are hard to uncover otherwise. Although interim 
officials may make statements in which they claim to be committed to holding elections 
and relinquishing power afterwards, these statements may merely be symbolic, aimed 
at avoiding short-term civil unrest (Shain and Linz, 1995). Furthermore, developing 
insight into interim officials’ political intentions by creating personal ties with them is a 
risky endeavour in former autocracies, because such ties can turn into major liabilities 
if  the interim regime is replaced by a regime with a different political or ideological 
stance (Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Siegel, 2007). As interim governments with the inten-
tion to become autocratic rulers are likely to keep that intention to themselves in fear 
of  civil unrest, political analysts are unlikely to have private insight into that intention 
either.
Given that signals are likely to be the only form of  information for investors to develop 
insight into an interim regime’s political intentions, what signal will they rely on? Below 
we propose that investors will focus on the relative number of  civilian fatalities during 
events of  government-related violence within the country.
Interim-Regime Dominance as a Signal of  Political Intentions
Defined as ‘violence against and by the government’ (van de Vliert et al., 1999, p. 291), 
government-related violence concerns physical confrontations within a country between 
civilians and governmental actors, whereby each of  these groups can be either the per-
petrator or the victim. In former autocracies with an interim regime, such confrontations 
may include anti-regime demonstrations that result in clashes with state security forces, 
street skirmishes between civilians and policemen, terrorist attacks on public properties 
such as army checkpoints, and military or police raids on terrorist strongholds or resi-
dences of  political activists (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Oetzel and Oh, 2014; Witte et al., 
2017). The frequent involvement of  weaponry in such violence often leads to fatalities 
among civilians and governmental actors (Oetzel and Getz, 2012).
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For investors, the share of  civilian fatalities in the total number of  fatalities of  govern-
ment-related violence may serve as a signal of  an interim regime’s political intentions. As 
explained in more detail below, this is because these intentions are likely to translate into 
the amount of  force that a regime uses against civilians and, thereby, into the distribution 
of  fatalities among civilians and state actors.
A sizeable body of  political science research has shown that regimes that intend to 
impose their rule on their people tend to use greater force in various types of  violent con-
frontations with civilians than regimes that aim to be responsive to civilian demands and 
interests (Davenport, 1999, 2007; Imbusch, 2003; Stanton, 2016; Straus, 2012). Scholars 
have provided two reasons why that is the case. First, the use of  strong force against civil-
ians is instrumental to realizing a regime’s intention to strengthen its rule because the use 
of  such force is a way to eliminate or intimidate political opponents (Davenport, 2007). 
Second, regimes that intend to impose their rule on their people are likely to lack a moral 
compass and thus see little merit in respecting human rights by exercising restraint in 
violent confrontations with civilians (Rummel, 1997).
A regime that uses strong force against civilians tends to deploy vast military and po-
lice resources throughout its territory (Bellin, 2004; Ukiwo, 2009), leading it to inflict 
many civilian fatalities and suffer limited losses among its own actors during instances 
of  government-related violence. In other words, the use of  strong force against civilians 
is likely to result in a high share of  civilian fatalities in the total number of  fatalities of  
government-related violence (Levy, 2010). For the sake of  brevity, we refer to this civilian 
fatality share as the ‘dominance’ displayed by an interim regime.
An interim regime’s dominance in government-related violence is a crude piece of  
public information and thus qualifies as a signal. It constitutes public information be-
cause media reports tend to specify the number of  fatalities of  instances of  violence and 
the distribution of  this number across civilian and state actors. Moreover, it is a crude 
piece of  information in two ways. First, the reported distribution of  fatalities is not nec-
essarily completely accurate because it may be an estimate or based on hearsay. Second, 
the fatality distribution reported for a given instance of  violence is not a perfect indicator 
of  an interim regime’s political intentions, since this distribution also depends on other 
factors, including civilians’ conflict experience and the types of  weapons they had at their 
disposal.
As explained in the Background section, an interim regime’s political intentions can 
change during its tenure. Since these intentions tend to be reflected in the dominance dis-
played by the regime during government-related violence, this dominance may thus vary 
across episodes of  such violence. The following case supports the existence of  such longi-
tudinal co-variation between a regime’s political intentions and its displayed dominance. 
During the First Intifada in 1987, the Israeli regime had the intention to contain the 
Palestinian street-uprising and therefore implemented ‘a policy of  relatively restrained 
use of  force’ (Levy, 2010, p. 393) that included the use of  rubber bullets instead of  live 
ammunition and the investigation of  every incident resulting in a Palestinian fatality. In 
contrast, during the 2009 Gaza offensive, the Israeli government had the intention to 
neutralize the Palestinian militant organization Hamas after the latter had launched a 
wave of  rocket attacks against southern Israel. This intention led the Israeli regime to 
use ‘overwhelming power’ in the form of  massive air and ground attacks, and to violate 
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human rights by treating all Palestinians out on the street as enemies of  the state and thus 
as legitimate military targets (Levy, 2010, p. 400).
The different intention of  the Israeli regime across both episodes of  violence was, in 
turn, clearly reflected in the distribution of  fatalities among both sides. Whereas during 
the First Intifada the Palestinian fatality count was six times higher than the number 
of  Israeli state fatalities, during the Gaza offensive it was 86 times higher (Levy, 2010). 
Although this example pertains to a conventional government rather than an interim 
one, it does show that the dominance displayed by a regime may vary substantially over 
time as a result of  changes in the regime’s political intentions.
In the case of  an interim regime in a former autocracy, investors aim to gain insight 
into whether the regime at a given point in time has the intention to initiate a demo-
cratic new normal or to become the new autocratic ruler. When an interim regime has 
the latter intention, it aims to impose its will on its people by illegitimately expanding 
its mandate. Since regimes that aim to impose their will on their people have been 
shown to use strong force against them (e.g., Davenport, 1999, 2007), and since the use 
of  such strong force expresses itself  in high regime dominance, an interim regime with 
autocratic intentions at a given point in time will likely display high dominance during 
violence occurring at that time. By contrast, when an interim regime at a given point 
in time has the intention to initiate a democratic new normal, it will likely display re-
straint during violence occurring at that time, so as to convincingly distance itself  from 
the oppressive practices of  its autocratic predecessor and encourage civilians to freely 
participate in the country’s elections as either candidates or voters. We therefore expect 
investors to interpret higher interim-regime dominance during a given event of  govern-
ment-related violence as a signal that the regime has weaker democratic intentions at 
that time.
In turn, investors will likely associate weaker democratic intentions on the part of  an 
interim regime with a less favourable political outlook for locally listed firms. The rea-
son is that a weaker democratization intention among interim officials suggests a higher 
possibility that these officials will recreate an autocratic system, which usually constitutes 
a less desirable state of  affairs for firms than a democratic system (Jensen, 2008). In 
autocracies, firms are more likely to encounter rent-seeking government officials and 
tend to experience greater difficulties in anticipating policy changes due to the generally 
less transparent political decision-making processes in such countries (Treisman, 2007; 
Youngs, 2004). Autocracies are usually also characterized by lower levels of  human cap-
ital formation, infrastructure spending, and public service provision (Brown and Hunter, 
2004; Lake and Baum, 2001) and therefore tend to experience lower economic growth 
than democracies (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008).
Furthermore, when interim officials indeed start to recreate an autocratic system, they 
may trigger a public backlash that causes further government-related violence or even 
a civil war (Derpanopoulos et al., 2016; Pevehouse, 2005). Such continued violence is 
likely to suppress local demand (Hiatt and Sine, 2014) and disrupt the local supply of  
production factors such as labour, capital, and raw materials (Darendeli and Hill, 2016), 
thereby harming locally-listed firms.
Since investors will likely interpret higher interim-regime dominance during a given 
violent event as a signal that the regime has weaker democratic intentions at that time, 
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and since they will likely associate such intentions with a less favourable political outlook 
for locally listed firms, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: Investors react more negatively to violent events characterized by higher 
interim-regime dominance.
The Moderating Role of  Firm-Specific Signals
Although investors will likely react more negatively to violent events characterized 
by higher interim-regime dominance, the degree to which they do so will vary across 
firms. This is because investors will likely consider some firms to be more resilient to 
the above-described adverse political developments that may result from high interim- 
regime dominance.
According to the literature on organizational resilience to political turmoil (Dai et al, 
2017; Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Oh and Oetzel, 2017), some firms have a pre-existing 
capacity, deriving from organizational resources and structures, that helps them cope 
with and survive adverse political developments by cushioning the harmful impact of  
such developments (De Carolis et al., 2009). Organizational resilience is a complex prop-
erty that is difficult to observe directly, however (DesJardine et al., 2019). Consequently, 
investors will likely look for firm-specific signals that serve as proxies for a firm’s resilience 
to adverse political developments. Below we argue that they will rely on three such sig-
nals: a firm’s foreign footprint, its indebtedness, and its ownership structure.
Foreign Footprint
While some firms realize most or all of  their sales domestically, others realize a high share 
of  their sales abroad and thus can be said to have a large foreign footprint (Hendriks et al., 
2018). Investors will likely perceive a larger foreign footprint as a signal that a firm is more 
resilient to the adverse political developments that may result from high interim-regime 
dominance. The reason is twofold. First, all else equal, firms with a larger foreign footprint 
realize a smaller portion of  their sales domestically and will thus experience a relatively 
smaller decline in profitability when adverse political developments cause domestic demand 
to drop (Kim et al., 1993). Second, firms with a larger foreign footprint tend to have better 
switching options for their domestic activities (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). Specifically, 
they are more likely to have tangible and intangible assets abroad, including sales offices, 
distribution and client networks, and possibly production plants. Consequently, they are 
usually better positioned to shift domestic sales or production activities abroad in response 
to adverse domestic developments, causing their total sales to suffer less from such devel-
opments (Lee and Makhija, 2009). Overall, these arguments are consistent with the more 
general view that geographic diversification provides a hedge against country-specific risks 
such as political upheaval, especially when such risks do not correlate highly across markets 
(Dai et al., 2017; Witte et al., 2017). Accordingly, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a: A firm’s foreign footprint weakens the degree to which investors react 
more negatively to violent events characterized by higher interim-regime dominance.
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Indebtedness
A firm’s indebtedness refers to its amount of  debt relative to its equity capital (Schijven 
and Hitt, 2012). Investors will likely perceive higher indebtedness as a signal that a firm 
is less resilient to the adverse political developments that high interim-regime dominance 
may entail. This is because more indebted firms tend to have less financial slack and are 
therefore more likely to go bankrupt when adverse political developments disrupt the 
local economy (Bourgeois, 1981; Cheng and Kesner, 1997). Specifically, because more 
indebted firms usually need to pay more interest, they are generally less profitable and 
therefore tend to face greater difficulties in sustaining their interest payments when their 
revenues decrease as a result of  adverse political developments (Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). 
Furthermore, because owners of  capital are usually less willing to provide funds to more 
indebted firms (George, 2005), such firms are less well able to raise additional capital 
that they may need to restructure their operations in response to political and economic 
adversity (Bromiley, 1991; Su et al., 2009). For these reasons, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2b: A firm’s indebtedness strengthens the degree to which investors react 
more negatively to violent events characterized by higher interim-regime dominance.
Ownership Concentration
A firm’s ownership structure, finally, concerns the degree to which its equity is con-
centrated in the hands of  one or a few large shareholders (‘blockholders’) or dispersed 
across many highly liquid or diversified owners. Compared to the latter, blockholders 
typically have longer-term investment horizons and a lower tendency to exit the firm be-
cause of  the illiquid nature and large size of  their investment (Edmans and Holderness, 
2017; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For similar reasons, blockholders also tend to be more 
dedicated towards the companies they invest in, oftentimes using private resources to 
‘prop-up’ their firms during stretches of  poor performance (Friedman et al., 2003). 
Finally, blockholders typically possess effective control over their firms’ investment, con-
tracting, and financing policies, meaning that they have considerable discretion over the 
strategic choices of  their firms (Stulz, 2005).
Building on research on the value of  corporate ownership structures during times of  
adversity (e.g., Ma et al., 2014; Mangena et al., 2012), we argue that investors will likely 
perceive more concentrated ownership as a signal that a firm is more resilient to the 
adverse political developments that may result from high interim-regime dominance. 
The reason is threefold. First, given the generally illiquid nature of  their holdings, block-
holders are less likely to sell their shares when adverse political developments occur (Hill 
and Snell, 1989), opting instead to just ‘sit out’ these developments and the capital losses 
associated with them. Consequently, firms with a concentrated ownership structure are 
more likely to be able to delay radical and costly restructurings until features of  the ulti-
mate policy environment become more concrete (Kozikhode, 2016; Rivoli and Salorio, 
1996). In enabling the option of  a wait-and-see approach, concentrated ownership pro-
vides strategic flexibility in the face of  what could turn out to be a temporary deterio-
ration of  the political and economic environment. Second, as the possession of  large 
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block holdings is often suggestive of  wealth (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2001; Heugens et 
al., 2009), blockholders may be able to infuse the firm with private funds when the po-
litical and economic environment deteriorates (Bae et al., 2012). Finally, the concentra-
tion of  control and decision rights has been shown to allow firms to operate with lower 
transparency (Fan and Wong, 2002). Although this feature of  concentrated ownership 
has conventionally been argued to result in greater information asymmetries between 
exploitative firm insiders and minority investors, Morck (1996, p. 73) contends that close-
ly-held firms are also more naturally perceived as ‘discrete and reliable partners’ for 
politicians of  all strides who seek to trade favours with business actors. For investors, con-
centrated ownership can thus indicate that a firm is politically-versatile – that is, capable 
of  engaging with and successfully courting whichever regime ultimately secures power 
(Chen et al., 2011; Morck et al., 2005). For these reasons, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2c: Concentration of  a firm’s ownership weakens the degree to which inves-
tors react more negatively to violent events characterized by higher interim-regime 
dominance.
DATA AND METHODS
Empirical Context: Government-Related Violence in Egypt During the 
Arab Spring
To test our hypotheses, we collected data on instances of  government-related deadly 
violence in Egypt following the overthrow of  President Hosni Mubarak’s autocratic re-
gime. The ouster of  his regime, and the events that transpired afterwards, were part of  
the broader wave of  uprisings against authoritarian governments that swept the Middle 
East and North Africa in early 2011, and which collectively became known as the ‘Arab 
Spring’.
The Arab Spring was instigated in late 2010 by the self-immolation of  a Tunisian 
street vendor after he was harassed by the police. Soon afterwards, a fervent revolu-
tionary movement spread, first in Tunisia itself  and later to other Arab states, including 
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. Underlying this movement was massive pop-
ular dissatisfaction with the autocratic status quo that characterized these countries, and 
which had manifested itself  in the form of  police brutality, rampant corruption, and the 
suppression of  political freedom. For the first time in decades, the once-stable autocracies 
of  the Middle East and North Africa seemed vulnerable, and the rise of  a democratic 
new normal in the region was no longer deemed unlikely (Lynch, 2012).
In Egypt, mass demonstrations against Mubarak’s 30-year autocratic rule began on 
25 January 2011 and continued until he was forced to resign on 11 February 2011. 
Immediately afterwards, the army-affiliated Supreme Council of  Armed Forces (SCAF) 
took temporary control of  the country for what was supposed to be six months, after 
which elections would be held. Elections were postponed, however, and the SCAF ex-
tended its rule by an additional ten months.
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Elections were ultimately held in May 2012 and Mohamed Morsi of  the previously 
outlawed Muslim Brotherhood became Egypt’s first democratically elected President on 
30 June 2012. Although Morsi’s election was internationally heralded at the time as a 
‘milestone’ in establishing a democratic new normal in the country (Reuters, 2012), his 
tenure was soon marred by allegations of  economic incompetence, authoritarianism, and 
adherence to a strict religious ideology that was incompatible with democracy, culminat-
ing in large-scale demonstrations against his rule. In a move described by US Secretary 
of  State John Kerry as a step towards ‘restoring democracy’, the army ousted Morsi on 3 
July 2013 and instated a second interim regime led by the Head of  the Supreme Court, 
Adly Mansour. This regime organized a new round of  elections, which were won by 
Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, the former Minister of  Defense under Morsi and leader of  the coup 
against him. El-Sisi was sworn into office as President on 8 June 2014.
Our study covers both interim regimes, spanning the period from 23 March 2011 
to 29 June 2012 and that from 4 July 2013 to 7 June 2014.1  There are two reasons 
why this two-part interim period is suitable for exploring how investors react to interim- 
regime dominance during events of  government-related violence. First, as shown below, 
the period contained many such events that were characterized by varying degrees of  
interim-regime dominance. Second, investors are likely to have used this dominance as 
a signal of  the political intentions of  the two interim regimes since there was consid-
erable uncertainty as to whether these regimes would actually initiate a transition to 
a democratic new normal. Specifically, although both regimes repeatedly made public 
statements in which they claimed to be committed to holding elections and relinquish-
ing power to elected authorities soon afterwards (Reuters, 2014), they also engaged in 
behaviour that could be seen as being at odds with a genuine desire for democratization 
(The Guardian, 2012; The New York Times, 2011). For instance, under the SCAF, pro-
testors were often punished by military tribunals and parliament was dissolved. Similarly, 
under President Mansour, the Muslim Brotherhood -the largest opposition group in the 
country- was officially classified as a terrorist organization.
Data Collection and Empirical Approach
To determine investors’ reactions to the dominance displayed by the two interim regimes 
during the violence occurring throughout their tenure, we conducted an event study. 
The methodology underlying such a study assumes that exogenous, unanticipated events, 
such as reports of  government-related violence, reveal new information to investors, who 
assess the expected consequences of  this information for firms’ future cash flows and de-
cide whether to buy, hold, or sell firms’ shares based on these expected consequences (e.g., 
Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007). The new information 
revealed by an event is thus swiftly incorporated into a firm’s stock price (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). Although investors may expect instances of  government-related vio-
lence to occur during interim periods in former autocracies, they are unlikely to be able 
to predict the specificities of  these instances (Czinkota et al., 2010; Oetzel and Oh, 2014), 
including the dominance shown by the interim regime at a given point in time. We thus 
contend that this dominance reveals new information to investors that causes them to 
update their expectations about the regime’s political intentions.
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To identify the most notable instances of  government-related violence during the 
Egyptian interim period, we collected all 4,891 front-page articles published during 
that period in Egypt’s most widely-read independent daily newspaper, Al-Masry Al-Youm 
(AMAY). We chose this newspaper because its independence likely implies that inves-
tors consider its articles more reliable than those published in state-owned newspapers 
(Blaydes, 2006), and because its high readership base is likely to encompass the bulk of  
Egyptian investors, who accounted for 77 per cent of  all trading on the Egyptian stock 
exchange over 2011–14 (The Egyptian Exchange, 2014). We then instructed an Arabic-
speaking research assistant to carefully read all articles and identify those that reported 
instances of  government-related violence in Egypt that had resulted in at least one fa-
tality among either civilians or state actors. The assistant identified 128 such articles, 
corresponding to 2.6 per cent of  the total number of  front-page articles.2  To assess the 
reliability of  the coding, one of  the authors of  this study independently coded a random 
selection of  423 articles, generating a 97.2 per cent inter-rater agreement rate.
When analysing the dates on which the instances of  government-related deadly vio-
lence were reported, we noticed that these dates were sometimes clustered, particularly 
around special occasions such as the anniversary of  Mubarak’s overthrow and new ap-
pointments within the interim cabinet. Moreover, prior research has shown that govern-
ment-related violence may be reciprocal (Francisco, 1996; Lichbach and Gurr, 1981), 
meaning that the perpetrators of  a violent act may become the targets of  a violent coun-
teract the next day. These observations led us to combine all consecutive days of  reported 
government-related violence into distinct ‘spells’, which form the events in our study (see 
Acemoglu, et al., 2017). A spell begins when an article reports an instance of  govern-
ment-related deadly violence and continues as long as at least one other instance of  such 
violence is reported every next day. A day without reported government-related deadly 
violence thus serves as the natural cut-off  point of  a spell. The 128 identified instances 
of  violence were thus reduced into 94 spells. The average and maximum number of  
instances of  violence per spell was 1.4 and 5 respectively, while the average number of  
days between consecutive spells was 8. The average number of  fatalities per spell was 13.
Dependent Variable
To quantify investors’ reactions to the dominance displayed by the interim regime during 
each spell of  violence, we first obtained from Datastream longitudinal data on the daily 
stock prices of  125 firms listed on the Egyptian stock exchange. We then employed the 
following standard market model to estimate the firm-specific relationship between these 
stock prices and a stock market-wide benchmark index for an estimation period prior to 
each spell of  violence:
where âi and b̂i are the estimates for firm i of  the OLS regression Ri ,t=ai+bi ⋅ Rm,t+ei ,t; 
Ri,t is the return on firm i’s stock on day t of  the estimation period; Rm,t is the return of  
the benchmark index on day t of  that period; ai the intercept and bi the slope coefficient 
for firm i; and ei,t the random disturbance estimate of  the market model.
3 
ARi ,t = Ri ,t −
(
âi + b̂i ⋅ Rm,t
)
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Because the stock prices of  the focal firms perfectly predict the performance of  an 
Egyptian benchmark index, we used as our benchmark index the MSCI Emerging 
Market Index, which includes 23 other national stock market indices besides the Egyptian 
one. In line with prior studies (e.g., El Nayal et al., 2019), we chose an estimation period 
starting 285 days and ending 30 days before the start date of  the event window of  a 
given spell of  violence.4  The start date of  each event window was defined to be the day 
prior to the reporting on the first instance of  violence within the spell. We did so because 
newspapers typically report instances of  violence the day after their occurrence, whereas 
investors may already hear about them on the day they occur (via social media, for exam-
ple).5  The end date of  each event window was defined to be the final consecutive day of  
reported violence within the spell. Thus, the event window of  a spell consisting of  three 
instances of  government-related violence reported in AMAY on 16, 17, and 18 March 
2014, respectively, was defined to be four days, i.e., 15 March through 18 March. By 
contrast, the event window of  an isolated instance of  such violence reported in AMAY 
on 10 October 2011 was defined to be the two-day period of  9 October and 10. The 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) generated by each spell were calculated as the 
sum of  the daily abnormal returns realized during the spell’s event window.
Main Independent Variable
We measured the interim regime’s dominance during a given spell of  violence by the 
share of  civilian fatalities in the total death toll of  the spell. We derived this share from 
the fatality figures that AMAY reported in its articles on the instances of  violence oc-
curring within the spell. Specifically, we calculated the total number of  civilian fatalities 
across all instances of  violence within the spell as well as the total number of  governmen-
tal fatalities across these instances. We then divided the former number by the sum of  the 
two numbers. In the few cases where an article reported either a fatality range or conflict-
ing figures obtained from different sources, we used the mean value. The share of  civilian 
fatalities in the total death toll of  a spell ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating 
higher interim-regime dominance. Several prior studies of  government-related violence 
used a comparable yet slightly different measure, namely the ratio of  civilian fatalities 
to government fatalities (Kaldor, 2013; Levy, 2010; Richani, 2016). The disadvantage of  
that ratio is that it has no value for spells of  violence without government fatalities. To 
avoid having to exclude such spells and thereby potentially introduce sample selection 
bias, we used the share of  civilian fatalities in the total death toll instead.
Moderating Variables
We measured a firm’s foreign footprint at the time of  a given spell of  violence by the 
share of  the firm’s foreign sales in its total sales in the last completed fiscal year prior to 
the spell (Hendriks et al., 2018). Firms with a higher such share realize a larger portion 
of  their sales outside Egypt and thus have a larger foreign footprint. A firm’s indebted-
ness at the time of  a given spell of  violence was measured by the book value of  its total 
debt relative to that of  its common equity in the last completed fiscal year prior to the 
spell (Schijven and Hitt, 2012). Concentration of  a firm’s ownership at the time of  a 
spell was measured by the percentage of  the firm’s shares that was held by its five largest 
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shareholders in the last completed fiscal year prior to the spell (Hu and Izumida, 2008). 
The higher this percentage, the more concentrated a firm’s ownership. The data on these 
three moderating variables were obtained from Datastream and Thomson Eikon.6 
Control Variables
We controlled for several spell-level and firm-level factors that may also affect investor 
reactions to spells of  government-related violence. We first of  all controlled for the se-
verity of  a spell of  violence by entering (i) its total death toll and (ii) its length in days. 
Regardless of  the distribution of  the fatalities across civilians and government actors, 
local stock markets tend to react more negatively to violence resulting in more fatalities 
(Eldor and Melnick, 2004), presumably because such violence is generally more disrup-
tive for local firms.7  For similar reasons investors may also react more negatively to longer 
spells of  violence.
We also controlled for several spatial attributes of  the spells, since spatial aspects 
of  violence have been shown to influence firms’ vulnerability to it (Dai et al., 2013). 
Specifically, we controlled for the spatial concentration of  violence within a spell by en-
tering a dummy variable equal to 1 if  all instances of  violence in the spell occurred in 
the same city, and 0 otherwise. We also included a dummy variable coded 1 for spells 
that contained one or more instances of  violence in Cairo, since violence in a country’s 
economic and political centre may be more disruptive. Likewise, we included a dummy 
variable coded 1 for spells that contained instances of  violence in the Sinai region, since 
this region became a hotbed for extremists after Mubarak’s fall and therefore a frequent 
target of  military operations, which may have been characterized by relatively high levels 
of  interim-regime dominance. The data on these spatial characteristics of  the spells were 
obtained from the newspaper articles.
We also entered a dummy variable coded 1 for spells starting on a Friday, since most 
mass protests during the interim period took place on that day (Acemoglu et al., 2017), 
and since such protests often resulted in severe violence lasting several days. Furthermore, 
we entered a dummy variable coded 1 for spells of  violence that occurred during the 
Islamic holy month of  Ramadan. We did so because such spells may be less severe, 
given that Islam – Egypt’s dominant religion – strongly denounces the use of  violence 
during Ramadan. Likewise, we entered a dummy variable coded 1 for spells of  violence 
that occurred under the second Egyptian interim regime and 0 for those that occurred 
under the first, so as to account for potential differences across these two categories of  
spells. Finally, we controlled for the number of  days between the start of  the focal interim 
regime’s rule and the start of  the focal spell, as violence occurring in the immediate after-
math of  regime change may be more severe.
At the firm level, we controlled for a firm’s size by entering the natural logarithm of  the 
book value of  the firm’s assets and for its accounting performance by entering its return 
on equity. We also entered a firm’s market-to-book ratio, measured by the market value 
of  the firm’s shares relative to the book value of  its common equity. Furthermore, we 
entered a dummy variable coded 1 for firms headquartered in a city where violence took 
place during a given spell (see Dai et al., 2013). We also entered three variables measur-
ing the percentage of  the five largest shareholdings in the firm that were in the hands of  
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(i) government agencies, (ii) non-Egyptian individuals or organizations, and (iii) financial 
institutions, respectively (Boyd and Solarino, 2016; Faccio and Lang, 2002). We entered 
these variables because not all types of  large owners may be equally willing to maintain 
their shareholdings during times of  adversity (van Essen et al., 2013), potentially causing 
investor reactions to spells of  violence to differ across firms with different types of  large 
owners. Finally, we controlled for a firm’s industry by entering a set of  dummy variables 
based on the two-digit SIC code of  a firm’s primary industry. The data on all firm-level 
variables were obtained from Datastream and Thomson Eikon, and pertain to the fiscal year 
preceding the focal spell of  violence.
Statistical Methods
We managed to collect complete data on all variables for a sample of  6,908 firm-spell 
observations. We subsequently analysed this sample using the following Ordinary Least 
Squares regression equation:
where CARi,j is the cumulative abnormal return on firm i’s stock resulting from spell j, 
IRDj the interim regime’s dominance during spell j, Mi a vector of  firm-level moderating 
variables, Xj a vector of  spell-level control variables, Yi a vector of  firm-level control vari-
ables, and ei,j the error term.
Because the observed CARs on a firm’s stock may be correlated across spells, we clus-
tered the standard errors of  the regression coefficients by firm (Cameron et al., 2011). To 
avoid multicollinearity stemming from the inclusion of  the interactions between inter-
im-regime dominance and the three firm-level moderating variables, we standardized all 
continuous predictors (Dawson, 2014).
RESULTS
Table I displays the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of  our variables. It 
shows, among others, that the average CAR generated by a spell of  government-related 
deadly violence is − 0.17 per cent (p < 0.001). For comparison, Drakos (2010) found 
that the average CAR resulting from 10,282 terrorist attacks in 22 countries over the 
period 1994–2004 was − 0.05 per cent. The table also shows that, with the exception of  
the correlation between the dummy variable for spells of  violence covering Cairo and 
the dummy variable for spells covering a firm’s headquarters city (r = 0.707), all other 
correlations are below 0.5, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern. This was 
confirmed by an inspection of  the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of  the independent 
variables, which were below the well-accepted multicollinearity threshold of  10 in all our 
regression models (Meyers et al., 2006), with the highest VIF being 4.87.
Table II shows the results of  the multivariate regression models that we estimated. 
Model 1 only contains the control variables, to which we add each of  our variables of  
interest in the subsequent models. Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1, which proposed that inves-
tors react more negatively to violent events characterized by higher interim-regime dom-
inance. This hypothesis is supported, since the regression coefficient of  interim-regime 
CARi ,j =훼+훽1IRDj +훽2IRDj ∗Mi +훽3Xj +훽4Yi + ei ,j
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dominance is significantly negative in Model 2 (β = −0.142, p < 0.001). The size of  the 
coefficient indicates that an increase in interim-regime dominance from one standard 
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean causes the CAR generated by 
a spell of  violence to decrease by 0.28 per cent on average.
Hypothesis 2a stated that a firm’s foreign footprint weakens the degree to which in-
vestors react more negatively to violent events characterized by higher interim-regime 
dominance. This hypothesis is tested in Models 3 and 6, both of  which yield a signifi-
cantly positive coefficient of  the interaction between interim-regime dominance and a 
firm’s foreign footprint (β = 0.021, p < 0.05 and β = 0.031, p < 0.01 respectively), lending 
support to Hypothesis 2a. To gain more insight into the interaction effect, we used the 
results of  Model 6 to plot the relationship between interim-regime dominance and CARs 
at low and high values of  a firm’s foreign footprint, i.e., at values one standard deviation 
below and above the sample mean, respectively. As shown in Figure 1, interim-regime 
dominance has a negative effect on CARs among firms with small foreign footprints and 
among those with large ones, but this effect is weaker among the latter firms.
Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that a firm’s indebtedness strengthens the degree to 
which investors react more negatively to violent events characterized by higher inter-
im-regime dominance, is tested in Models 4 and 6. This hypothesis is not supported, as 
the coefficient of  the interaction between interim-regime dominance and a firm’s indebt-
edness is insignificant in both models.
Hypothesis 2c, finally, predicted that concentration of  a firm’s ownership weakens 
the degree to which investors react more negatively to violent events characterized by 
higher interim-regime dominance. This hypothesis receives support, as the interaction 
between interim-regime dominance and ownership concentration is significantly positive 
Figure 1. The effect of  interim-regime dominance on CARs for firms with a small and large foreign footprint, 
respectively.
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in Models 5 and 6 (β = 0.106, p < 0.01 and β = 0.110, p < 0.001 respectively). Figure 2 
displays this interaction based on Model 6. It shows that the relationship between inter-
im-regime dominance and CARs is substantially negative for firms with relatively dis-
persed ownership structures, but almost non-existent for firms with concentrated ones.8 
Supplementary Analyses
We conducted two additional analyses.9  First, we tested our hypotheses for each of  the 
two Egyptian interim regimes separately by splitting our sample into the two respective 
time periods. Hypotheses 1 and 2c were supported for each regime whereas Hypothesis 
2b was marginally supported for the second regime (β = −0.050, p < 0.10). Hypothesis 
2a, moreover, no longer received support, perhaps because of  the smaller size of  the sub-
samples in combination with the limited variation in foreign footprint among our sample 
firms, whose average foreign footprint was just 2.7 per cent.
Second, to gain insight into the boundary conditions of  our theoretical framework, we 
explored whether our hypotheses also hold for the non-interim period in post-Mubarak 
Egypt. This period has so far seen two regimes, both of  which were democratical-
ly-elected. A priori we therefore would not necessarily expect to obtain results similar to 
those for the interim period. Using the same data collection and coding procedures as 
before, we identified from a total of  4,644 front-page articles published in AMAY, 157 
instances of  government-related deadly violence that occurred under the two demo-
cratic regimes up to June 2015, and consolidated those instances into 97 spells. After 
running our analysis on this sample, we found that the democratic regimes’ dominance 
Figure 2. The effect of  interim-regime dominance on CARs for firms with low and high ownership 
concentration, respectively.
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during these spells had a significantly positive effect on the CARs on Egyptian firms’ stocks 
(β = 0.276, p < 0.001). In addition, we found no significant moderating effects of  a firm’s 
foreign footprint, indebtedness, and ownership structure. In the next section we provide 
a possible explanation for these findings.
DISCUSSION
As radical changes in the business environment have become more common in recent 
decades, management scholars and practitioners have started to show increasing interest 
in the phenomenon of  a ‘new normal’ (Ahlstrom et al., 2017; El-Erian, 2010; Verbeke, 
2018). Some scholars have viewed this new normal as referring to the business environ-
ment that has emerged after the 2008 financial crisis, an environment characterized by 
previously exceptional demand uncertainty and systematically lower productivity growth 
in developed countries (Clougherty et al., 2019; Storm, 2017).
Around the same time, however, several developing countries witnessed developments 
that cleared the road for, but not always led to, the rise of  another type of  new normal, 
namely a democratic one (Devermont and Temin, 2019). Specifically, since 2010 Arab 
countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and – most recently – Sudan saw the 
rapid demise of  their long-standing autocratic rulers and were expected by some to start 
implementing a system of  democratic governance for the first time (Lynch, 2012).
Many of  these countries installed interim regimes to initiate and guide the transition 
to a democratic new normal. However, such regimes may have or develop the private 
intention to become their country’s new autocratic rulers, a possibility that has been 
proven all too real in several cases throughout history. The emergence of  a new normal 
may thus be highly uncertain, complicating corporate decision-making. Our study sheds 
light on how investors deal with the uncertainty about the emergence of  a democratic 
new normal during an interim regime’s tenure. Enriching the behavioural perspective 
on investor decision-making with insights on regimes’ use of  violence, we have pro-
posed that investors interpret higher interim-regime dominance during a given violent 
event as a signal that the regime has weaker democratic intentions at that time. We 
therefore advanced the hypothesis that violent events characterized by higher interim- 
regime dominance are received more negatively by the local stock market, a hypothesis 
for which we found support in an event study of  94 spells of  government-related violence 
in Egypt during the Arab Spring. In addition, we found that negative investor reactions 
to interim-regime dominance are weaker for firms with larger foreign footprints or more 
concentrated ownership structures, suggesting that investors perceive firms to be differ-
entially resilient to the more adverse political outlook associated with higher interim- 
regime dominance.
Whereas we found that high dominance displayed by the two Egyptian interim re-
gimes generally triggered negative investor reactions, a supplementary analysis revealed 
that high dominance shown by the two democratically-elected Egyptian governments 
generally triggered positive responses from investors. One possible explanation is that, 
in countries where autocratic rule has collapsed only recently, investors interpret the 
signal of  regime dominance differently across interim and democratically-elected 
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governments. Specifically, whereas investors are likely to interpret high dominance by 
an interim government as a signal of  weak democratic intentions, they may interpret 
high dominance by a democratically-elected government as a signal of  the govern-
ment’s capacity to remain in power until the end of  its constitutional term (Tyler, 2006). 
In young democracies such as Egypt, investors may value this capacity positively, since 
such democracies are fragile and could thus easily slide into anarchy if  their govern-
ment is perceived to be incapable of  fending off  challenges to its authority (Gills and 
Rocamora, 1992). This differential investor interpretation of  high regime dominance 
may also explain why we found no significant moderating effects of  our three indicators 
of  a firm’s resilience to adverse political developments for the period of  democratic 
governance.
Contributions and Implications
Overall, our conceptual and empirical analysis contributes to three streams of  manage-
ment research. First, it extends the emergent literature on the behavioural perspective 
of  investor decision-making (Bergh et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2011; Schijven and Hitt, 
2012). This literature has argued that, since managers may have intentions that are at 
odds with shareholder value creation and since they are unlikely to express such inten-
tions, investors will attempt to infer them from crude pieces of  public information called 
‘signals’, so as to make more informed investment decisions. Our study contributes to 
this literature by providing evidence suggesting that investors also use signals to develop 
insight into the private political intentions of  interim governments ruling in the after-
math of  authoritarianism. We thus show that, besides using signals to reduce information 
asymmetries vis-à-vis managers, investors show similar information-seeking behaviour to 
reduce information asymmetries vis-à-vis external actors whose actions may have a pro-
found effect on firms’ future cash flows and, thus, investor wealth. Future studies could 
further advance the behavioural perspective of  investor decision-making by exploring 
whether investors also use signals to develop insight into other governmental intentions 
besides democratization, such as a regime’s geopolitical or economic intentions (e.g., 
Katagiri and Min, 2019).
In addition, our study suggests that, besides relying on signals to develop insight into 
actors’ intentions, investors also rely on signals to develop insight into hard-to-observe 
company characteristics. Specifically, investors seem to use a firm’s foreign footprint and 
its ownership structure as signals of  its resilience to deteriorations in a country’s political 
outlook. A possible reason is that investors may distrust managerial statements about 
that resilience, given that such statements may be overly optimistic, for instance owing 
to managerial hubris (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). Future studies could explore whether 
investors also use signals to develop insight into other latent characteristics of  firms, such 
as the strength of  their organizational culture (Barney, 1986).
By contrast, we found no evidence that investors use a firm’s indebtedness as a signal of  
its resilience to adverse political developments. One possible reason is that if  a country’s 
political situation deteriorates severely, not only high-debt firms but also low-debt ones 
may become unable to obtain the capital required to restructure their operations, caus-
ing them to be equally vulnerable to bankruptcy. Overall however, our findings provide 
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substantial evidence that investors simultaneously scrutinize signals at the regime and 
firm level to gauge the consequences of  local violence for locally listed firms.
Second, our study contributes to the stream of  management research on how firms 
are affected by violence. Some studies within this stream explored the role of  the severity 
of  violence. For instance, Hiatt and Sine (2014) found that new ventures in regions with 
more homicides and kidnappings have lower survival rates, whereas Witte et al. (2017) 
found that countries with more battle-related deaths receive less greenfield foreign direct 
investment. Other studies focused on the role of  spatial attributes of  violent conflict, 
finding that the proximity and spatial size of  such conflict are positively related to the 
likelihood that a foreign firm exits a country (Dai et al., 2013, 2017). We add to this liter-
ature by showing that, after controlling for the severity and spatial attributes of  govern-
ment-related violence, the distribution of  the fatalities of  such violence across civilians 
and regime actors substantially influences investors’ assessment of  the political outlook 
for local firms and, hence, the market value of  these firms. We thus call attention to the 
affiliation of  the fatalities of  violence as an additional characteristic of  violence that may 
have important consequences for businesses.
Third, our study contributes to management research on political uncertainty. This 
research thus far predominantly conceptualized political uncertainty as stemming from 
a shortage of  political constraints on policy change, and explored the corporate rele-
vance of  cross-country differences in the level of  such constraints (Hendriks et al., 2018; 
Henisz, 2000; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). We, however, have conceptualized political 
uncertainty as stemming from the private nature of  a regime’s political intentions and 
explored how investors cope with such uncertainty within a given country under a given 
regime, thus keeping political constraints constant. We specifically explored this question 
in the context of  an interim period because during such a period the political uncertainty 
concerns the emergence of  a new normal for the country and is thus highly consequen-
tial to investors’ holdings in local firms. Future research could explore how investor or 
firm behaviour is affected by still other sources of  political uncertainty than a shortage 
of  political constraints and the private nature of  political intentions. These other sources 
may include the health condition of  an ageing dictator or the secretive nature of  ongoing 
trade negotiations between countries.
Besides making academic contributions, our study also offers valuable insights for offi-
cials and managers. Prospective interim officials may benefit from our findings by realiz-
ing that higher levels of  interim-regime dominance tend to weaken investors’ confidence 
in the prospects of  local firms. Interim regimes that repeatedly show high dominance 
may thus eventually cause the local stock market to collapse and thereby generate an 
economic crisis, which may undermine the regime’s authority and legitimacy. Interim 
officials with genuine democratic intentions are thus well-advised to consciously decide 
on their use of  force against civilians and exercise restraint as much as possible, so as to 
minimize the harmful consequences of  violence for the local economy.
For managers of  firms based in countries that may experience a collapse of  autocratic 
rule, our study suggests a way to limit stock price decreases during the interim period 
that may follow such a collapse. Specifically, our finding that a firm’s foreign footprint 
causes investors to react less negatively to high interim-regime dominance suggests that 
managers can limit stock price decreases resulting from such dominance by increasing 
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their firm’s foreign footprint in anticipation of  a possible interim period characterized by 
high regime dominance. By limiting stock price decreases in this way, managers may be 
able to successfully issue additional equity when needed, avoid drops in their stock-based 
personal compensation, and maintain the support of  shareholders and the board.
Limitations and Corresponding Suggestions
Although we have proposed that interim-regime dominance is by definition a crude indi-
cator of  a regime’s political intentions, our operationalization of  the indicator has several 
limitations that need to be acknowledged. First, unlike prior studies, we were unable to 
operationalize it as the ratio of  civilian fatalities to regime fatalities, owing to the absence 
of  the latter fatalities in several of  the analysed spells. Prior studies did not encounter this 
complication because they focused on larger-scale armed conflicts that resulted in both 
civilian and regime fatalities. Second, we derived our measure from the front-page news 
of  one Egyptian newspaper. As a result, we may not have captured all instances of  gov-
ernment-related deadly violence that occurred during the interim period, for example 
because some instances may have been reported on subsequent pages or may not have 
been reported at all owing to editorial choices. Furthermore, although the large majority 
of  investors in Egyptian stocks resides in Egypt and is therefore likely to have obtained 
news on government-related local violence from our data source, foreign investors may 
have obtained such news from foreign media. Although the latter media are likely to have 
covered the more severe instances of  government-related violence in Egypt, they may 
not have reported on instances resulting in only one or a few fatalities. Future studies 
could therefore attempt to replicate our measure of  interim-regime dominance using a 
variety of  news sources, including international ones.
Another limitation is that we did not consider other signals that investors might use to 
develop insight into an interim regime’s political intentions, in addition to its dominance 
during events of  government-related violence. Recent research suggests that investors 
are capable of  cognitively processing a limited set of  signals simultaneously, although 
they typically assign differential weights to them (Drover et al., 2018). Investors might for 
instance also infer an interim regime’s political intentions from mass civilian arrests and 
the issuance of  anti-democratic directives aimed at curbing the influence of  parliament 
or the judiciary. Future studies could explore whether investors also use such pieces of  
information as signals and, if  so, which signal they assign most weight to and how they 
cope with possibly conflicting signals.
Finally, since our analysis was limited to the two Egyptian interim regimes, and since 
these regimes were of  a different type than those in several other formerly autocratic 
countries, our results may not be generalizable to all such countries. Specifically, whereas 
the Egyptian interim regimes were essentially new regimes, the interim regimes in other 
former autocracies such as Chile and South Korea consisted largely of  representatives of  
the ousted regime (Shain and Linz, 1995). Furthermore, whereas Egypt’s interim regimes 
were appointed by local factions, those of  countries such as Iraq and Cambodia were 
appointed and closely monitored by foreign governments. Future studies could explore 
whether the dominance displayed by these other types of  interim regimes affects investor 
valuations of  local firms differently.
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CONCLUSION
Our study offers novel insight into investors’ use of  signals in the context of  an interim 
period following the fall of  an autocratic ruler. We show that, in such a context, investors 
interpret higher interim-regime dominance during a given spell of  violence as a signal 
that the regime has weaker democratic intentions at that time and that a more busi-
ness-friendly, democratic new normal is therefore less likely to materialize. Furthermore, 
we show that investors deem firms with a larger foreign footprint or a more concen-
trated ownership structure more resilient to the adverse political outlook associated with 
high interim-regime dominance. More generally, by infusing the behavioural perspec-
tive on investor decision-making with insights on regimes’ use of  violence, our study 
demonstrates the value of  cross-fertilization between management and political science 
research.
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NOTES
 [1] Amidst the turmoil that accompanied the overthrow of  Mubarak, the Egyptian stock market was closed 
from 27 January to 23 March 2011. We therefore use the latter date as the starting date of  our analysis 
of  how investors react to interim-regime dominance.
 [2] 4,155 articles reported news other than instances of  violence, whereas 608 reported instances of  vio-
lence that were not government-related or not deadly.
 [3] We obtained qualitatively similar results when we used mean-adjusted expected returns, which are 
based on the average of  a stock’s daily returns over the estimation period (Brown and Warner, 1985).
 [4] For a given spell of  violence, the estimation period is thus the same for all sample firms. Although the 
estimation period typically contains prior spells of  violence, these prior spells were experienced by all 
sample firms, meaning that the stock market’s reaction to them is incorporated in the calculation of  
the expected returns for all firms. Hence, the fact that for most spells of  violence the estimation period 
contains prior spells is likely to generate merely noise in the resulting abnormal returns rather than 
firm-specific bias. Moreover, to account for variation in the characteristics of  prior spells that are part 
of  the estimation window of  a given spell, we also ran our regression models while controlling for (a) 
the number of  these prior spells, (b) the total death toll resulting from them, and (c) the average inter-
im-regime dominance observed for them. These analyses yielded qualitatively similar results.
 [5] For 95.3 per cent of  the reported instances of  violence, their date of  occurrence was mentioned in the 
newspaper article. In 98.4 per cent of  these cases, the occurence date was the day before the article ap-
peared, supporting the validity of  our approach of  using that date as the start date of  an event window.
 [6] Our dataset has many missing values for firms’ foreign footprint, presumably because firms listed on 
the Egyptian stock exchange are not required to report geographic breakdowns of  their revenues. In 
unreported robustness analyses, we excluded this variable from our models, resulting in a larger sample 
of  10,552 firm-spell observations. We continued to find a similar degree of  support for Hypotheses 1, 
2b, and 2c.
 [7] Our sample includes one extremely severe spell of  violence, which took place from 14 to 16 August 
2013 and generated 343 fatalities, of  which 304 were civilians and 39 government forces. To explore 
whether this outlier drives our results, we also ran our regression models without it. We obtained qual-
itatively similar results.
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 [8] We explored the existence of  a curvilinear effect of  interim-regime dominance following the procedure 
outlined by Haans et al. (2016), but found insufficient evidence for the existence of  such an effect. We 
also ran our models using a binary variable coded 1 for spells of  violence with interim-regime domi-
nance values above the sample mean and 0 otherwise, and found the same degree of  support for our 
hypotheses.
 [9] The results of  these analyses are available from the authors upon request.
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